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USING THE LANGUAGE OF TURNER V.
ROGERS TO ADVOCATE FOR A RIGHT TO
COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
SHANE T. DEVINS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Like many compromises in law and life, the one at the highest level
of [Turner v. Rogers1] only delays to some near-future Court Term
the resolution of the tough questions about how far the Sixth
Amendment, or the due process clause, ought to extend into these
hybrid cases.2

In Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court of the United States
declined to extend the right of appointed counsel to an indigent
defendant held in contempt for violating a child support order.3 At
first glance, this holding is a seemingly detrimental blow to the
hope for appointed counsel in civil proceedings for indigent
parties.4 However, a closer reading of the dictum in Turner may
very well create the right to appointed counsel in other civil
proceedings.5 This Comment demonstrates how the Supreme
* JD, 2013 and LLM Candidate, International Business and Trade Law, May
2014. Thank you to the past and present members of THE JOHN MARSHALL
LAW REVIEW whose efforts contributed to the publication of this Comment,
especially Paul Coogan and Brian Roth for their thoughtful editing. Also,
thank you to my parents, Bernie and Sheri Devins, and my brother, Damon,
for their constant encouragement and support.
1. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
2. Andrew Cohen, Turner’s Trumpet: Child Support and the Right to
(June
21,
2011),
Counsel,
ATLANTIC
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/06/turners-trumpet-childsupport-and-the-right-to-counsel/240753.
3. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
4. See Mark Walsh, A Sour Note from Gideon’s Trumpet, A.B.A. J., Sept.
2011,
at
16,
available
at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_sour_note_from_
gideons_trumpet/ (interviewing various legal scholars on their views regarding
the holding of Turner); Archive for the “Symposium (Turner v. Rogers)”
OPS.,
Category,
CONCURRING
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/category/symposium-turner-vrogers (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (discussing the implications of the holding in
Turner to the cause of appointed counsel in civil proceedings).
5. The Court specifically stated that it would not address due process
concerns that arise in a complex case where fairness requires appointed
893
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Court has effectively given new life to the argument for a right to
appointed counsel in immigration removal proceedings.
It has long been established that immigration removal
proceedings are solely civil proceedings.6 As such, the protections
of the Sixth Amendment do not apply in removal proceedings.7
Nonetheless, noncitizens have a right to procedural due process8
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.9
counsel. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520. Further, the Court would not address
proceedings in which a parent owed child support to the state because the
government would be represented by skilled counsel. Id. Also, it did not
address child support proceedings in which counsel represented the custodial
parent herself. Id. The fact that the Court did not address these areas is
relevant because it means the Court must find these areas or circumstances
significant and thus possibly requiring appointed counsel. This language is
further analyzed in Section III of this Comment.
6. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (explaining that
immigration removal proceedings are civil actions that determine whether a
noncitizen is eligible to remain in the United States, but that the proceedings
are not meant to punish unlawful entry into the United States).
7. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516 (stating that “the Sixth Amendment
does not govern civil cases”). The Court explained that a state may provide
fewer procedural protections in civil proceedings than in criminal proceedings
because procedural due process governs civil proceedings, not the Sixth
Amendment. Id.; see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980)
(stating that the protections of the Sixth Amendment are only available in
criminal prosecutions); Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (explaining that the
various protections afforded in criminal cases do not apply in immigration
removal proceedings because those proceedings are civil and not criminal); Xu
Yong Lu v. Ashcroft, 259 F.3d 127, 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of appointed counsel does not apply to immigration
removal proceedings); Baires v. I.N.S., 856 F.2d 89, 90 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that noncitizens in removal proceedings do not have a Sixth Amendment right
to appointed counsel but do have a right to procedural due process under the
Fifth Amendment).
8. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1446 (2011) (noting that “[t]he phrase
‘due process of law’ has the same meaning in both the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments”). The Fourteenth Amendment merely applies the
same principles of due process to states as is applied to the federal government
by the Fifth Amendment. Id. While they are both “coextensive,” the due
process protection under the Fifth Amendment is not necessarily coextensive
to the Fourteenth Amendment in all situations, such as when the federal
government has some overriding interest that justifies legislation that would
be impermissible as a state level action. Id. According to C.J.S., substantive
due process analyses are the same under both the Fourteenth and Fifth
Amendments. Id. Thus, the line of cases involving the right to appointed
counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment can be applied to federal causes of
action under Fifth Amendment due process and vice versa. Id.
9. See Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 883 F. Supp. 1365,
1372 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (recognizing that noncitizens have a right to due process
once they have entered the United States); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
693 (2001) (explaining that the Due Process Clause applies to all people in the
United States, including aliens, regardless of their current status as
documented or undocumented); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003)
(citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)) (confirming that the Fifth
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While this Comment, like others,10 argues for the right to
appointed counsel for indigent noncitizens in removal proceedings,
it approaches this argument through a post-Turner lens in order to
demonstrate how the Court’s analysis of procedural due process
and the dictum in its opinion advance pre-Turner arguments on
this point. Others have also argued for a right to appointed
counsel using the language of Turner, but this Comment creates a
more complete argument by using examples of removal
proceedings and other civil right-to-counsel holdings.11 In addition,
it calls for a revision of the statutory language of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.
Section II of this Comment first discusses how procedural due
process rights for noncitizens have been established and also
provides a history of the case law governing a right to appointed
counsel in civil proceedings, specifically immigration removal
proceedings. Section III then offers an in-depth analysis of the
language in Turner to illustrate how it may be utilized to advance
the argument for appointed counsel for indigent noncitizens in
immigration removal proceedings. Section IV proposes that
advocates for the right to appointed counsel in immigration
removal proceedings use the language of Turner and other court
holdings12 to argue that it is a right the Constitution guarantees.
Lastly, this Comment proposes that the language of the
Immigration Nationality Act (“INA”) be modified to statutorily
implement indigent noncitizens’ right to appointed counsel in
immigration removal proceedings.

Amendment entitles all aliens to due process of law in removal proceedings
before a final removal order can be entered); United States v. Barraza-Leon,
575 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that an alien subject to removal
must be afforded due process).
10. See generally Michael Kaufman, Detention, Due Process, and the Right
to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C. R. & C. L. 113 (2008) (arguing
for the right to appointed counsel in removal proceedings under due process
and case law); Matt Adams, Advancing the “Right” to Counsel in Removal
Proceedings, 9 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 169 (2010) (arguing for the right to
appointed counsel in removal proceedings and showing the harm caused in the
absence of counsel).
11. See Mark Noferi, “Turner” Could Support Appointed Counsel for
Immigrants, N.Y. L.J., July 22, 2011, at 1; Cyrus D. Mehta, Right to Appointed
Counsel in Removal Proceedings? The Supreme Court May Have Opened the
Door in Turner v. Rogers, INSIGHTFUL IMMIGR. BLOG (June 29, 2011, 9:16
PM),
http://cyrusmehta.blogspot.com/2011/06/right-to-appointed-counsel-inremoval.html; Daniel Curry, The March Toward Justice: Assessing the Impact
of Turner v. Rogers on Civil Access-to-Justice Reforms, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 487, 493-94 (2012) (all arguing that the analysis in Turner supports a
right to appointed counsel for noncitizens).
12. The other holdings involve courts tackling appointed counsel and
procedural due process issues not necessarily in the context of immigration
removal proceedings. They are discussed in Section II.
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II. BACKGROUND
Arguments are abundant in the legal community for the right
to counsel in the context of immigration removal proceedings.13
This section therefore discusses a noncitizen’s right to procedural
due process protections and also provides the historical
development of case law, regarding the right to appointed counsel,
both inside and outside the context of immigration removal
proceedings.
A. Noncitizens Have a Constitutional Guarantee of Due Process
The Supreme Court holds that procedural due process must
be afforded to citizens and noncitizens alike.14 Due process rights
for noncitizens are triggered once they enter the United States.15
In Zadvydas v. Davis the Court asserted that noncitizens are
afforded due process, whether they are “lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.”16 Therefore, a noncitizen placed in
removal proceedings can bring a claim for violation of his
constitutional right to procedural due process just as if he is a
citizen of the United States.17
To analyze an alleged procedural due process violation, a
court must apply the factors established in Mathews v. Eldridge:18
13. Kaufman, supra note 10.
14. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (holding that “once an alien enters the
country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process clause applies to
all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens”).
15. Am. Arab, 833 F. Supp at 1372. “[T]he critical distinction is not
whether the alien is applying for an immigration benefit that requires a
showing of admissibility, but simply whether the alien has entered the United
States.” Id.; see also Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (stating, in
dicta, that once an alien has entered the border of the United States they have
established enough ties with the country to be afforded due process of law).
16. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 679 (2001).
17. Am.-Arab, 883 F. Supp. at 1372. The District Court in American Arab
stated that in cases where a noncitizen claims that procedural due process
rights have been violated, courts consistently use the Mathews balancing
factors. Id. (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see also
Landon, 459 U.S. at 34; Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(applying Mathews factors in immigration procedural context).
18. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2517. “[W]e consequently determine the ‘specific
dictates of due process’ by examining the ‘distinct factors’ that this court has
found useful in deciding what specific safeguards the Constitution’s Due
Process Clause requires in order to make a civil proceeding fundamentally
fair.” Id. (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). In any case concerning a
procedural due process violation, the Court has turned to the Mathews factors.
See e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (using the Mathews
factors to determine whether a due process violation occurred when the
plaintiff was detained indefinitely due to his classification as an “enemy
combatant”); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., 452 U.S. 18, 31
(1981) (applying the Mathews factors in order to determine whether a right to
appointed counsel existed for indigent parents in a proceeding that could

Do Not Delete

2013]

10/18/2013 4:33 PM

Using the Language of Turner v. Rogers to Advocate

897

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.19

Accordingly, the following subsection discusses how the
Mathews factors have been used to argue for a right to appointed
counsel in immigration removal proceedings.
B. No Definitive Answer by the Courts
The language of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
is the starting point and the source of a right to counsel in
immigration removal proceedings, but noncitizens currently must
pay for their legal representation.20 The INA states that
noncitizens “shall have the privilege of being represented, at no
expense to the government,21 by counsel of the alien’s choosing
who is authorized to practice in such proceedings.”22 Nonetheless,
courts have held that there are circumstances23 in which a right to
result in the termination of parental rights).
19. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
20. Immigration and Nationality Act § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006)
[hereinafter INA § 292].
21. Even in situations where the noncitizen is able to retain counsel at his
or her own expense, the right to counsel (at government expense) safeguard
fails. Baltazar Alcazar involved a noncitizen couple that had each individually
secured counsel and petitioned for suspension of removal. Baltazar Alcazar v.
I.N.S., 386 F.3d 940, 941 (9th Cir. 2004). The couple primarily spoke Spanish
and had a sixth grade education. Id. at 943. On the day of the hearing, an
attorney did not appear for the husband, but one did for the wife. Id. at 942.
The judge set a new date for the hearing to allow for the husband to retain
new counsel. Id. However, the judge also banned the entire firm that had
originally represented the husband from doing so for the rest of the
proceedings. Id. When the same firm represented the husband and wife at a
later proceeding, the judge refused to allow the attorney to represent the
husband. Id. The judge then told the wife she could either proceed pro se with
her husband, or separate their trials and continue with her attorney. Id. at
943. The couple decided to proceed together pro se. Id. The immigration court
held that the couple had waived their right to counsel and did not sufficiently
establish eligibility for suspension of deportation. Id. at 944. The Ninth
Circuit, on appeal, remanded the decision and held that there had to have
been “a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel” in order for the
waiver to have been sufficient. Id. at 945, 949. The court held that their lack of
understanding of their role in the proceedings or their burden severely
prejudiced them. Id. at 948.
22. INA § 292.
23. Lack of counsel can lead to detrimental consequences, such as the
erroneous detention of even legal permanent residents. In Casas-Catrillon v.
Department of Homeland Security, the plaintiff filed a writ of habeas corpus
after being detained for three years while awaiting the court’s review of a final
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appointed counsel exists in immigration removal proceedings.24
For instance, in Aguilera-Enriquez v. I.N.S., a petitioner
argued that his right to due process had been violated because he
was not afforded assistance of counsel during his removal
proceedings.25 The Sixth Circuit ultimately held that he was not
entitled to appointed counsel, but first articulated a test to
determine whether appointed counsel was necessary in his case.26
The court’s test for “whether due process requires the appointment
of counsel for” a noncitizen in removal proceedings considers
whether the “assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide
‘fundamental fairness the touchstone of due process.’”27
In United States v. Campos-Asencio, the Fifth Circuit stated
that a noncitizen “has a right to counsel if the absence of counsel
would violate due process under the Fifth Amendment.”28 The
court did not offer a test in order to determine whether the
absence of counsel would violate due process for the noncitizen,
but it clearly indicated that there are circumstances under which
appointed counsel is necessary.29
removal order. Casas-Catrillon v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 94445 (9th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff was a legal permanent resident of the United
States and was imprisoned for a burglary charge. Id. The Department of
Homeland Security served the plaintiff with a notice to appear and the
immigration judge found that he was a removable alien due to his commission
of two crimes of “moral turpitude.” Id. Originally, the plaintiff filed the
petition for habeas corpus with the district court because he was a pro se
litigant unfamiliar with the process. Id. at 946. After nearly three more years
of detention, the plaintiff’s petition was finally heard, but only because of a
Congressional decision to move all pending habeas corpus petitions to the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 947. The Ninth Circuit was finally
able to hear his petition and reversed and remanded the case to determine
whether bond-hearing requirements had been met—but this was only after
the erroneous seven-year detention period. Id. at 952.
24. See Aguilera-Enriquez v. I.N.S., 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975)
(applying a test of “fundamental fairness” to determine whether appointed
counsel was necessary in immigration removal proceedings); United States v.
Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that although
there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel in immigration removal
proceedings, there can be a right to counsel if absence of counsel would violate
procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment).
25. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 568.
26. Id. The court stated that courts have been “vigilant to ensure that
aliens” are afforded their constitutional rights. Id. It explained that the test as
to whether due process requires the appointment of counsel in an immigration
removal proceeding is based on fundamental fairness. Id. The court
articulated this test instead of the Mathews test because, simply enough,
Mathews v. Eldridge would not be decided until the following year. However,
this “fundamental fairness” test is part of the basic framework of the Mathews
factors and a due process analysis.
27. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 568 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
28. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d at 509.
29. Id. The court in Campos explicitly stated that there are circumstances
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C. Cases Outside of Immigration Removal Proceedings
The Supreme Court long ago established the right to
appointed counsel in criminal and criminal contempt
proceedings.30 However, the Court has never definitively and
explicitly answered the question of when due process requires a
right to appointed counsel in civil proceedings. Nonetheless, the
Court’s language in decisions regarding a right to counsel in civil
proceedings has left the door open. The Court seemingly admits
that there are circumstances in which due process requires counsel
be provided to an indigent defendant in civil proceedings.31
Moreover, Court holdings in a few landmark cases outside the
criminal realm have found the right to appointed counsel.
For instance, the Supreme Court held, in In re Gault, that
juveniles in delinquency proceedings are entitled to appointed
counsel under the Due Process Clause because of the similarity to
criminal proceedings.32 In the context of civil proceedings,33 the
under which the Fifth Amendment would require a right to appointed counsel
in immigration removal proceedings. Id. However, the court did not establish
any test. Id.
30. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963) (holding that
the federal right to counsel applies to states through incorporation under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932)
(establishing a federal requirement for the right to appointed counsel in
criminal cases).
31. See generally Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18 (continuing the trend and using the
Mathews factors in determining the right to appointed counsel on a case-bycase basis instead of creating a hard-and-fast rule).
32. In re Gault involved a fifteen-year-old boy, already on probation, who
was arrested after making lewd remarks to a neighbor over the phone. In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967). No notice was given to the parents that the
juvenile had been arrested. Id. at 5. After about three or four days in custody,
the child was released and soon received a notice about further hearings on his
“juvenile delinquency.” Id. at 6-7. The child was charged with “lewd phone
calls” and was sentenced as a delinquent to the State Industrial School until
he turned twenty-one “unless sooner discharged by due process of law.” Id. at
7-8. A writ of habeas corpus was then filed with the Supreme Court of Arizona,
which dismissed the writ. Id. at 10. In the writ, the child asserted that he had
a right to counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment in juvenile proceedings
when taken from the custody of his parents and put in a state institution. Id.
The Supreme Court of the United States stated that the juvenile proceedings
are like criminal proceedings, and that the child was not afforded the same
due process rights as an adult. Id. at 29. If the child had been over eighteen,
he would not have been in juvenile court and would have received the
procedural protection of the Sixth Amendment in criminal court for the
charges of lewd conduct. Id. The Court ultimately held that the assistance of
counsel is necessary for the determination of delinquency in juvenile
proceedings due to the possibility of incarceration in a state institution until
the juvenile reaches the age of twenty-one. Id. at 37.
33. In Lassiter, Abby Gail Lassiter was found to have neglected her child
for not providing proper medical care. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20. A year later,
she was convicted of second-degree murder of an adult and sentenced to
twenty-five to forty years imprisonment. Id. The Department of Social
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Supreme Court stated that a right to appointed counsel can “exist
only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty.”34 According
to the Court, determining whether appointed counsel is necessary
will be made on a case-by-case basis.35
Most recently, in Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether counsel should be appointed when
an indigent party faces incarceration due to civil contempt.36 In
Turner, a father was held in contempt of court for violating a child
support order.37 Turner had been held in contempt on five previous
occasions for failure to pay child support.38 In two of the prior
contempt holdings, he spent a few days in jail before paying the
child support and being released.39 However, by the fifth time, the
Court sentenced Turner to six months in jail due to his repeated
failure to make child support payments.40 Following his sentence,
Turner appeared at a sixth contempt hearing in which the Court
sentenced him to another twelve months imprisonment for his
failure to pay.41 With the help of a pro bono attorney, Turner
appealed his sentence. On appeal, he claimed that he was entitled
to have appointed counsel at the contempt hearing.42 After the
Supreme Court of South Carolina ruled that he had no such right,
the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.43
In analyzing whether Turner had a right to appointed

Services then petitioned the court to terminate her parental rights. Id. at 21.
In the parental right termination proceedings, Lassiter proceeded without
counsel and did not claim that she was indigent. Id. at 22. Lassiter appeared
pro se in the proceedings, and the Court ultimately terminated her parental
rights. Id. at 24. On appeal, Lassiter argued that, due to her indigence, she
was entitled to appointed counsel under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The North Carolina Court of Appeals denied
Lassiter’s arguments, and the North Carolina Supreme Court denied the
application for review. Id. The Supreme Court of the United States granted
certiorari, and held that the Due Process Clause requires a determination
about what “fundamental fairness” is in a particular situation by looking at
precedent and the interests at stake. Id. at 25. The Court then used the
Mathews factors in order to determine whether counsel should have been
appointed for Lassiter. Id. at 27. The Court ultimately held that an indigent
litigant only has a right to appointed counsel when there is a possibility of
deprivation of physical liberty. Id. at 26-27. Therefore, Lassiter was not
entitled to appointed counsel because she did not face loss of physical liberty.
Id. at 33.
34. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 25.
35. Id. at 26, 31.
36. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512.
37. Id. at 2513.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2514.
43. Id.
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counsel,44 the Supreme Court used the factors in Mathews v.
Eldridge to determine whether his right to procedural due process
was violated.45 The Court found that, because of the additional
procedural safeguards available, there was no necessary right to
appointed counsel.46 However, in Turner’s case, the Court found
that the judge had failed to follow these additional procedural
safeguards.47 Due to this failure, the Court remanded the case to
determine whether Turner could make the child support
payments.48
The Court’s holding that there is no right to appointed
counsel in cases like Turner is detrimental to the argument for the
right to appointed counsel in any civil proceeding.49 However, the
Court in Turner emphasized that its holding was narrowly tailored

44. In analyzing Turner’s argument that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated a right to counsel for indigent
defendants that may face incarceration, the Court determined the minimum
due process required for a defendant in Turner’s position. Id. at 2518. This
issue was technically outside of what the writ of certiorari granted, which was
whether a civil right to counsel exists under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2524 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissent in
Turner criticizes the majority for this action. Id.
45. Id. at 2517-18. The Court held that it must use the “distinct factors”
that the Supreme Court has previously used in deciding what procedural due
process requires. Id.
46. Id. at 2518-19. The Court stated that an inquiry into the defendant’s
ability to pay is determined prior to providing the defendant with counsel
when these additional procedures are followed:
[1] notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue in
the contempt proceeding; [2] the use of a form (or the equivalent) to
elicit relevant financial status; [3] an opportunity at the hearing for the
defendant to respond to statements and questions about his financial
status, (e.g., those triggered by his responses on the form); and [4] an
express finding by the court that the defendant has the ability to pay.
Id. The Court held that these safeguards were enough protection and
therefore, there was no need for appointment of counsel. Id. at 2520.
47. Id. The judge at the contempt proceedings made no finding concerning
Turner’s ability to pay nor did he ask any follow up questions on this issue. Id.
at 2513-14. Further, the judge left the prewritten financial form blank and did
not mark whether Turner had the ability to pay or not. Id. This failure to
address the ability to pay is why the Supreme Court ultimately remanded the
case to determine whether Turner had the ability to pay. Id. at 2520.
48. Id.
49. Id. Many of those in the “Civil Gideon” movement, the movement
arguing for a right to appointed counsel in civil proceedings, saw Turner as a
great chance for the Supreme Court to finally rule for civil appointed counsel.
CONCURRING OPINIONS, supra note 4. When the ruling was issued in June
2011, many of those scholars were upset that the Court skated the issue and
did not ultimately decide the larger question of when civil appointed counsel is
a constitutional right. Id. Other scholars recognized that there were potential
positive changes that could arise out of the decision, and that the language
itself could eventually help argue for a right to appointed counsel in other
circumstances. Id.
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to circumstances involving an indigent defendant held in contempt
for violating a child support order when the opposing party also
does not have counsel.50 This holding, therefore, does not apply to
other civil proceedings.51 Rather, the dictum in Turner and the
Court’s specific language aids the argument for a right to
appointed counsel in immigration removal proceedings.52 It does so
by seemingly creating three separate categories that the Court
deems areas where appointed counsel may be necessary. As the
next section demonstrates, these categories can all be directly
applied to the circumstances of indigent defendants that are
involved in immigration removal proceedings.
III. ANALYSIS
As provided, Turner ultimately held that there is no
automatic right to appointed counsel in civil cases found in the
Due Process Clause.53 However, the Court explicitly stated that its
narrow holding only applied to civil contempt proceedings
instigated for failure to pay child support when the opposing party
does not have counsel.54 Thus, advocates can utilize the dictum in
Turner to argue that due process requires appointment of counsel
for an indigent noncitizen in immigration removal proceedings.55
A. The Dictum of Turner
By narrowly tailoring its holding in Turner, the Court
explicitly provided the exact circumstances in which the Due

50. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520. “We do not address civil contempt
proceedings where the underlying child support payment is owed to the state .
. . nor do we address what due process requires in an unusually complex case
where a defendant ‘can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate.’” Id.
51. Id. The Court narrowly tailored its ruling to:
[T]he provision of counsel where the opposing parent or other custodian
(to whom support funds are owed) is not represented by counsel and the
state provides alternative procedural safeguards equivalent to those we
have mentioned (adequate notice of the importance of ability to pay, fair
opportunity to present, and to dispute relevant information, and court
findings).
Id.
52. Section III elaborates on this argument using the dictum of the holding
and its specific language narrowing the application of the holding to show that
an argument can be made for the necessity of appointed counsel in
immigration removal proceedings.
53. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
54. Id.
55. Legal scholars have previously proposed using the language of Turner
in order to advocate for a right to appointed counsel in immigration removal
proceedings. See supra text accompanying note 11. This Comment furthers
these proposals by combining case law and precedent to produce a more
complete argument and, unlike the other articles, this Comment also proposes
alteration to the language of the INA.
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Process Clause does not require appointed counsel: a “civil
contempt proceeding to an indigent individual who is subject to a
child support order, even if that individual faces incarceration” in
which counsel does not represent the opposing party to whom the
funds are owed, and the state provides additional procedural
safeguards for the indigent individual.56 Under the Mathews test,
while the Court found Turner’s interest compelling, he nonetheless
lost on the remaining Mathews factors.57 Because the Court found
that “additional procedural safeguards” were available during the
contempt proceedings, it concluded that Turner was adequately
protected without appointed counsel.58
Turner’s holding qualified that it does not apply to: (1) civil
contempt proceedings where the government is a party because
“the government is likely to have counsel or some other competent
representative;” or (2) “an unusually complex case where a
defendant ‘can fairly be represented only by a trained advocate.’”59
The following subsection considers this concept of “additional
procedural safeguards” available in certain civil proceedings, but
demonstrates that these safeguards are minimal in immigration
removal proceedings.
B. The Additional Procedural Safeguards in Turner Are Not
Available in Immigration Removal Proceedings
When the Court in Turner analyzed the Mathews’s factor of
“additional procedural safeguards,” it also provided a list of
examples of what these potential procedural safeguards could be.60
Those potential safeguards are:
[1] notice to the defendant that his “ability to pay” is a critical issue
in the contempt proceeding; [2] the use of a form (or the equivalent)
to elicit relevant financial information; [3] an opportunity at the
hearing for the defendant to respond to statements and questions
about his financial status; and [4] an express finding by the court
that the defendant has the ability to pay.61

According to the Court, as long as the state institutes these
procedural safeguards or their equivalent, then there is no need
for appointed counsel in civil proceedings.62 Clearly, these precise
examples of procedural safeguards do not apply directly to
immigration removal proceedings. However, as illustrated below,
even an equivalent of Turner’s procedural safeguards cannot be

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2519.
Id.
Id.
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found in removal proceedings.63
As discussed in Section II, the protections of the Sixth
Amendment do not apply in immigration removal proceedings
because they are civil proceedings and not criminal.64 Therefore,
the procedural safeguards attending criminal proceedings do not
apply.65 Courts have held that the procedural safeguards in
immigration removal proceedings are minimal because noncitizens
“do not have a constitutional right to enter or remain in the United
States.”66 Thus, the procedural safeguards to which noncitizens
are entitled are the right to notice, the opportunity to present
evidence and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to assistance
of counsel at their own expense.67 Under the Code of Federal
Regulations—portions of which implement the INA—an
immigration judge is also required to inquire whether the
noncitizen wishes to have counsel, advise the noncitizen of
available free legal services, and ensure respondent has a list of
those legal services and his rights on appeal.68
These minimal procedural safeguards may disadvantage69 a
63. For example, in Barthold v. INS, the immigration judge asked a
noncitizen whether he wanted to be represented by an attorney in his
immigration removal proceedings. Barthold v. I.N.S., 517 F.2d 689, 691 (5th
Cir. 1975). The noncitizen responded by asking whether the government could
give him an attorney. Id. The judge replied that an attorney could represent
the noncitizen if he paid for it. Id. The noncitizen informed the judge that he
could not afford an attorney, to which the judge asked if he wished to call
Legal Services to see if it would provide him with an attorney. Id. The
noncitizen responded that he would then just continue without an attorney.
Id. The judge then informed him that he would adjourn the case at any time
that the noncitizen felt he needed an attorney. Id. Although a generous offer
by the judge, this is a useless safeguard for an indigent unable to afford an
attorney. It is not in line with the safeguards available (and required) in
Turner.
64. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038. See supra text accompanying notes
6-7 (explaining the civil nature of immigration removal proceedings).
65. See Schroeck v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 947, 951 (10th Cir. 2005) (revealing
that because immigration removal proceedings are civil, only minimal
procedural safeguards apply and noncitizens are not eligible for the
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment); Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 968,
973 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that since immigration removal proceedings are
civil, noncitizens in those proceedings are not entitled to the procedural
safeguards that are available under the Sixth Amendment).
66. Schroeck, 429 F.3d at 951-52 (citing Aguilera v. Kirkpatrick, 241 F.3d
1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 2001)).
67. Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006)
[hereinafter INA § 240A]. This section explicitly lists these as the only rights
available to noncitizens during removal proceedings. Id.
68. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(1)-(3) (2012).
69. In Aguilera-Enriquez, dissenting District Judge DeMascio discussed
the importance of appointed counsel in immigration removal proceedings.
Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 572 (DeMascio, J., dissenting). Looking at In re
Gault, the judge argued that absence of counsel directly violates the
noncitizen’s right to “fundamental fairness” at his proceedings. Id. He further
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noncitizen who is incarcerated for an indefinite duration,
depending upon the charges for removal, while he awaits hearing
before the immigration judge.70 They can also lead to improper
removal from the United States, especially when the noncitizen
either waives his right to counsel or receives ineffective assistance
of counsel during removal proceedings.71 Further, judicial review
of removal proceedings is significantly limited, which provides
little chance that errors will be corrected.72 The cases below,
although not an exhaustive list, highlight the lack of procedural
safeguards.
Schroeck v. Gonzales illustrates the detrimental impact the
lack of safeguards can have to a noncitizen seeking adjustment of
status.73 Schroeck concerned a noncitizen with previous charges
stated that deportation proceedings parallel the punishments in criminal
proceedings. Id. at 573. Therefore, the noncitizen must be afforded the right to
appointed counsel so that he can make all claims that can be made on his
behalf. Id.
70. In Demore, a legal permanent resident was detained awaiting removal
proceedings after the Attorney General deemed him removable for the
commission of two crimes: petty theft and burglary. Demore, 538 U.S. at 513.
The resident did not dispute the crimes or the grounds for removal, but argued
that being detained because of his previous crimes while awaiting his removal
proceedings violated his due process rights. Id. at 514. The government,
however, claimed that detention of a noncitizen charged with committing a
crime was the only way to prevent the commission of additional crimes while
awaiting removal proceedings. Id. at 515. The Court, therefore, held that an
indefinite detention while the noncitizen awaits trial is permissible and does
not violate due process. Id. at 531. The Court did limit its holding to only the
detention of a criminal alien who has conceded his removability. Id.
After that case, a noncitizen in Nadarajah v. Gonzales was incarcerated
for about five years despite never being charged with a crime. Nadarajah v.
Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). The noncitizen admitted his
removability but requested asylum during his removal hearing. Id. at 1073.
The court granted the noncitizen asylum, but the government reopened the
proceedings to introduce more evidence. Id. The court, however, granted the
noncitizen asylum in the second hearing as well. Id. at 1074-75. Nonetheless,
he remained in custody and was denied bond. Id. at 1075. The court ultimately
found that the detention was unreasonable and ordered the immigrant to be
released after five years of erroneous incarceration. Id. at 1084.
71. See generally Casas-Castrillon, 535 F.3d 944 (reversing a decision that
allowed a noncitizen to be held in detention for seven years awaiting judicial
review of his removability); Partible v. I.N.S., 600 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1979)
(involving an order of removal that the court reversed due to an improper
waiver of counsel elected by a judge); United States v. Jimenez, 921 F. Supp.
1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (reversing an immigration judge’s order of removal after
determining that the judge had effectively threatened the noncitizen to waive
counsel by telling him he would be placed in prison if he fought the removal
proceedings).
72. Immigration and Nationality Act § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005)
[hereinafter INA § 242]. This section of the Act lists the cases in which judicial
review is impermissible. Id.
73. In Schroeck, the noncitizen attempted to apply for adjustment of status
based on his marriage to a United States citizen, but had overstayed the
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for sexual assault that a criminal court dismissed with prejudice.74
Despite the dismissal, however, the government presented
evidence of the sexual assault charges as a criminal conviction
during the noncitizen’s removal proceedings.75 When the
noncitizen raised the issue of double jeopardy, the immigration
court stated that because he was only entitled to the due process
protection of the Fifth Amendment during his proceedings, he was
not entitled to protection from double jeopardy.76
Additionally, in Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit
held that a noncitizen who followed inaccurate advice of his
attorney regarding the suspension of his deportation under the
newly enacted Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”)77 did not suffer a violation of
his due process rights.78 The court reasoned that “[r]emoval
proceedings do not become constitutionally unfair simply because
they are precipitated in part by an attorney’s advice . . . or because
the [noncitizen] might believe that he could avoid detention until
eligible for another form of relief.”79
While courts find that the “procedural safeguards” given to
immigrants in removal proceedings are substantial enough to
protect their due process rights, these “safeguards” nonetheless
consistently fail or are not administered by courts.80 For instance,
in United States v. Jimenez, the court determined that the
length of time his visa permitted him to remain in the United States.
Schroeck, 429 F.3d at 949. Because his past crimes rendered him removable
from the United States, the noncitizen requested that the immigration judge
overlook his past crimes and grant his adjustment of status application. Id.
The immigration judge agreed to overlook the noncitizen’s three past criminal
convictions, but would not ignore the allegations of sexual assault. Id. While
the sexual assault charges had been dismissed with prejudice in the criminal
proceedings, the immigration judge allowed testimony from the alleged victim.
Id. Ultimately, the judge found that the noncitizen did commit rape and
therefore was not eligible for adjustment of status to that of a permanent
resident. Id. The noncitizen was then held removable. Id. at 952. The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision. Id.
74. Id. at 949-50.
75. Id. at 950.
76. Id. at 951-52.
77. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
§ 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009-594 to 3009-596, 8 U.S.C. §1229b (2008).
78. Lara-Torres, 383 F.3d at 974.
79. Id.
80. See generally Partible, 600 F.2d at 1094 (reversing removal decision
because of error of immigration judge due to improper waiver of counsel);
Campos-Ascencio, 822 F.2d at 510 (reversing removal decision to determine
whether the noncitizen had in fact been informed of his right to counsel and
whether he had competently waived that right); Jimenez, 921 F. Supp. at 1058
(finding the immigration removal proceedings to be “procedurally infirm”
despite lack of prejudicing the defendant); Gjeci v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 416 (7th
Cir. 2006) (reversing removal decision after immigration judge refused to
allow continuance so noncitizen could retain counsel).
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noncitizen had waived his right to counsel after the judge told the
defendant during his criminal proceedings that he had every right
to “fight” removal from the U.S., but that if he did, the government
was “gonna lock [him] up again and it will be up to [the
government] how much time [the noncitizen would] have to spend
[in jail].”81 Although it was a criminal case, the court examined the
problems with the defendant’s previous removal proceedings.82
Ultimately, the removal decision was upheld despite a finding that
no waiver had been made because the court deemed that the
noncitizen was not prejudiced.83
Further, courts frequently find that noncitizens waived their
right to counsel even when they did not understand the waiver.84
For example, in Leslie v. Attorney General of the United States, the
immigration judge failed to advise the noncitizen of the
availability of free legal services and did not confirm the
noncitizen’s receipt of a list of those free services.85 The noncitizen
proceeded without counsel and the court eventually ordered him to
be removed.86 Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
ultimately reversed the decision because of the judge’s failure to
advise the noncitizen of his rights in that case,87 violations of
immigration regulations occur regularly, further diminishing the
already minimal safeguards available.
Claims of lack of waiver and ineffective assistance of counsel
are procedural and, as a result, courts have disagreed as to
whether prejudice is a necessary component in order to reverse an
order of removal in those situations.88 This disagreement only
81. Jimenez, 921 F. Supp. at 1057. Despite this obvious lack of adherence
to the procedural safeguards, the court held that because it did not prejudice
the noncitizen it was not reversible error. Id. at 1058.
82. Id. at 1055.
83. Id. at 1058.
84. In Jimenez, for example, after the court asked the noncitizen whether
he wanted to waive his right to counsel, he responded, “I just want to leave.”
Id. at 1057; see also United States v. Polanco-Gomez, 841 F.2d 235, 237 (8th
Cir. 1988) (holding that a court asking all fifty-two noncitizens at once
whether they wished to waive counsel was effective waiver); Baltazar, 386
F.3d at 949 (reversing removal due to improper waiver of counsel attributed to
lack of understanding because the noncitizens did not speak English and had
only a sixth grade education).
85. Leslie v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 611 F.3d 171, 173-74 (3d Cir. 2010).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 182-83.
88. See id. at 178 (holding that violations of an agency regulation
protecting fundamental rights would invalidate the challenged action without
a need to consider prejudice); but see Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight
Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 539 (1970) (holding that the removal decision is only
reviewable with “a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining
party”); United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that violation of procedure can only render removal reversible when
the interests of the noncitizen are prejudiced).
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increases the lack of procedural safeguards and the chance of
erroneous removal of noncitizens because it creates a lack of
consistency in the decisions of the court. The following subsection
examines the other two situations in which Turner’s holding does
not apply: complex proceedings and proceedings involving the
government as a party.89
C. Complexity and Government as a Party Exceptions Also Apply
to Removal Proceedings
In Turner, the Court explicitly stated that it did not want to
address proceedings in which the government is the opposing
party90 because the government “is likely to have counsel or some
other competent representative.”91 Further, the Court mentioned
that it did not want to address an “unusually complex case” in
which a defendant would need representation by counsel for the
proceedings to be fair.92
The first scenario, in which the government is the opposing
party, is clearly applicable to immigration removal proceedings.
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) administers and
enforces United States immigration laws and oversees removal
proceedings.93 In every removal proceeding, the United States is
the opposing party attempting to remove the noncitizen.94
With regard to complexity, the courts have consistently
agreed that the immigration laws95 and their application in
proceedings are extremely complex, especially procedurally.96
89. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2009). The United States government created the
Department of Homeland Security in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6
U.S.C. § 111 (2004).
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2009).
95. “This complexity is compounded by the frequency with which the INA
has been amended in recent years. In the past two decades, the INA has been
subject to a number of substantial revisions and amendments.” Kaufman,
supra note 10, at 122.
96. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (explaining that
immigration law is a complex legal specialty and can therefore be confusing to
those who are not legal professionals in the immigration field); Ram v.
Mukasey, 529 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Biwot v. Gonzales, 403
F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005)) (stating that the complexity of immigration
trials make them like a “labyrinth that only a lawyer could navigate”); United
States v. Juan Vasallo-Martinez, No. 08cr2965-BEN, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
105434, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2008), rev’d, No. 09-50324, U.S. App. LEXIS
28023 (9th Cir. Dec. 21, 2009) (examining other courts’ decisions and
recognizing the consistent notion that immigration removal proceedings are
complex); Lara-Torres, 383 F.3d at 974 (explaining that noncitizens unfamiliar
with the laws can find the procedures to be intricate and complex); Saakian v.
I.N.S., 252 F.3d 21, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing how the right to counsel
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Further, the “high stakes of a removal proceeding and the maze of
immigration rules and regulations make evident the necessity of
the right to counsel.”97 The complexity of the proceedings has led
the courts to already determine that a right to counsel at the
noncitizen’s expense is imperative to a fair trial.98 However, those
noncitizens that cannot afford to pay for counsel themselves are
left to navigate this confusing area of law alone.99 To appoint
counsel will guarantee that the noncitizens are able to understand
their rights and ensure that a fair trial will occur.100
IV. PROPOSAL
A. Could Turner Be the Missing Piece?
Turner may be the missing piece of the puzzle in the
argument for appointed counsel in immigration removal
proceedings. The Court, although not explicitly, named the
possible areas where appointed counsel may be necessary.101 When

is a necessary part of procedural due process but not discussing appointed
counsel); Castro-O’Ryan v. I.N.S., 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1987)
(discussing the complexity of immigration laws and stating that a lawyer is
typically the only one able to understand the procedures). As a side note, the
language in the Padilla holding has also been used to argue for a right to
appointed counsel in immigration removal proceedings also. See generally
Duncan Fulton, Emergence of a Deportation Gideon?: The Impact of Padilla v.
Kentucky on Right to Counsel Jurisprudence, 86 TUL. L. REV. 219 (2011)
(analyzing the language of Padilla and arguing that it indicates a willingness
to recognize a “deportation Gideon” right).
97. Ram, 529 F.3d at 1242 (citing Biwot, 403 F.3d at 1098).
98. See Iturribarria v. I.N.S., 321 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating
that the reason noncitizens want to have legal counsel is so that they can
abide by the complex procedural requirements that are involved in
immigration removal proceedings); Monjaraz-Munoz v. INS, 327 F.3d 892, 897
(9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the “special role” of attorneys helping noncitizens
who have entered immigration removal proceedings); Ram, 529 F.3d at 1242
(citing Biwot, 403 F.3d at 1098) (explaining that immigration law and
regulations make the necessity of counsel self-evident).
99. After a noncitizen has been deemed to have waived the right to counsel
at the proceeding, they must then proceed without counsel. See generally
Cobourne v. I.N.S., 779 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir.) (finding that after the
noncitizen had made an effective waiver of counsel he was required to proceed
without counsel for the remainder of the removal proceedings); Barraza-Leon,
575 F.2d at 222 (finding that the noncitizen had made an effective waiver of
counsel and thus had to proceed without counsel and could not challenge the
waiver after a ruling adverse to his interest).
100. In Aguilera-Enriquez, Judge DeMascio discusses the unconscionability
of terminating a noncitizens right to remain the United States without
appointed counsel to an indigent noncitizen. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at
572 (DeMascio, J., dissenting). He further discusses that the deportation is a
“lasting punishment” that requires appointed counsel to satisfy due process.
Id. Indigent defendants need assistance in these proceedings. Id.
101. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2520; see also supra text accompanying note 4
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Turner is used in conjunction with the other precedent regarding a
right to counsel in civil proceedings, advocates can argue for this
right in removal proceedings. As addressed in Section II, the Court
developed a strategy of a case-by-case analysis using the Mathews
factors when addressing the right to appointed counsel in civil
proceedings.102 Further, according to Lassiter, only in cases of loss
of physical liberty can appointed counsel be found.103 By tying this
in with Gault, advocates can show that the Court developed a per
se rule for juvenile proceedings calling for a right to appointed
counsel because of the similarity those proceedings have to
criminal proceedings. Advocates for a right to appointed counsel
have used Gault for the argument that immigration removal
proceedings are also similar to criminal proceedings.104 Gagnon
also provided advocates the ability to argue that appointed counsel
is necessary whenever “fundamental fairness” calls for it.105
Aguilera applied this principle to immigration removal
proceedings explicitly, and by testing whether appointed counsel
was necessary in Aguilera, the Court agreed that a right to
appointed counsel must exist in some immigration removal
proceedings. Lastly, the dicta in Turner shows that there are
certain cases that the Supreme Court of the United States believes
may call for the right to appointed counsel.
By using these cases, advocates for a right to appointed
counsel in immigration removal proceedings can show that due
process for noncitizens calls for the right to appointed counsel for
indigent defendants during immigration removal proceedings.
Lassiter’s holding that the potential loss of physical liberty
necessitates a right to counsel for an indigent defendant is easily
satisfied in removal proceedings, as noncitizens are frequently

(noting Turner’s potential effect on counsel appointments in civil proceedings).
102. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 26-27, 31 (adopting the case-by-case approach
and using the Mathews factors to any case involving a right to appointed
counsel in civil proceedings).
103. Id.
104. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 28-29 (stating that because juvenile proceedings
resembled criminal proceedings, a right to appointed counsel was necessary).
Thus, advocates argue that due to the similarities of immigration removal
proceedings and criminal proceedings, a right to appointed counsel is
necessary there also.
105. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790. In Gagnon, the Court developed the case-bycase approach in determining whether appointed counsel is necessary in civil
proceedings. Id. Advocates have used the language of Gagnon requiring
fundamental fairness in order to argue that fundamental fairness necessitates
a right to appointed counsel in removal proceedings because of the large risks
of loss of physical liberty, as was required in Lassiter. Id.; see also Renewing
the Call: Immigrants’ Right to Appointed Counsel in Deportation Proceedings,
20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 393, 402-04 (2000) (analyzing the language of
Gagnon, Gault, and Aguilera-Enriquez in examining the necessity for counsel
in immigration removal proceedings).
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detained for indefinite amounts of time. Gault’s holding that
proceedings that are extremely similar to criminal proceedings call
for a right to appointed counsel is also satisfied because
noncitizens, like juveniles, need assistance of counsel in order to
understand the law, to be able to intelligently analyze the facts,
and to determine whether a defense to removal exists. Gagnon’s
requirement of appointed counsel when fundamental fairness
dictates is also satisfied in removal proceedings because indigent
noncitizens face the ultimate loss of forcible removal from the
United States and from their family, possessions, and
employment.
Turner, as shown in Section III, requires additional
procedural safeguards that, in removal proceedings, are minimal
and fail quite often. Further, the government is always a party to
the removal, and understanding the complex removal proceedings
far exceeds the knowledge of the average layperson.
The Court in Turner analyzed all of the cases discussed above,
except Aguilera-Enriquez, in order to determine whether
appointed counsel was necessary under due process for an indigent
defendant held in contempt for violating a child support order.106
Analyzing these cases is the reason that the Court ultimately
tailors its holding so that it will not apply to situations where the
government is a party, where there are no additional procedural
safeguards, and where the proceedings are complex. Therefore, by
satisfying the elements that the Court has laid out in these
decisions, a strong argument can be made to show that
immigration removal proceedings necessitate a right to appointed
counsel by simply using the language of the above-mentioned
decisions.
B. INA Revision
As stated previously, the language of the INA, under the
“Right to Counsel” heading, states that noncitizens have a right to
counsel but at no expense to the government (the “at no expense”
restriction).107 Although it does not necessarily prohibit a right to
appointed counsel,108 it has created a roadblock for advocates of
appointed counsel in these proceedings and has left very little case
law to review regarding the right to appointed counsel.109 This
106. Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2516.
107. INA § 242.
108. See Richard Pena, The Quest to Fulfill Our Nation’s Promise of Liberty
and Justice for All: ABA Policies on Issues Affecting Immigrants and Refugees,
A.B.A. 1, 5 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/publicserv/immigration/107b_comprehensive_immig_reform
.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing how the INA does not preclude a right to
counsel but “merely affirms that counsel need not be provided”).
109. See Adams, supra note 10, at 175 (explaining how “at no expense to the
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impedes “the government’s interest in the most informed decisions
being made under its laws.”110 Further, it has caused courts to
focus on the requirements of the INA and neglect to look at when
appointed counsel is necessary.111 There are very few federal cases
that actually challenge the lack of appointed counsel, whether
under the INA or under a constitutional-right attack.112 The “at no
expense” restriction has survived many amendments since it was
originally created in 1952.113 It has still allowed the government to
offer legal assistance,114 but they may not fund any sort of actual
legal representation.115
Despite the restriction on appointed counsel, however, courts
like Aguilera-Enriquez have shown that there can be
circumstances under which legal counsel needs to be appointed in
immigration removal proceedings.116 Therefore, the “at no

government” has deterred any sort of right for appointed counsel in
immigration removal proceedings); and Kaufman, supra note 10, at 126-27
(arguing that because the INA does not allow the government to pay for
counsel, indigent noncitizens are unable to afford representation). Further,
confinement of noncitizens impairs their ability to attempt to raise money to
retain counsel because they obviously cannot work while they are confined. Id.
Despite the help from nonprofit organizations that exist to provide legal
services to indigent noncitizens, such services are not able to keep up with the
demand and have limited resources. Id.
110. Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the Need for Appointed Counsel, MIGRATION
POL’Y
INST.
INSIGHT
1,
17
(Apr.
2005),
available
at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/in sight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf.
111. See Adams, supra note 10, at 175-76 (explaining that the “at no
expense” provision has caused case law to focus on whether immigration
judges have informed noncitizens of their rights in trial and effective
assistance of counsel instead of whether counsel should be appointed to
indigent noncitizens who are vulnerable to removal because of it).
112. See id. at 176 (showing that the INA has reduced the courts’
willingness to examine the right to appointed counsel through the lens of a
constitutional violation, especially in the Supreme Court).
113. Kerwin, supra note 110, at 7-8.
114. For instance, the Immigration Representation Project (IRP) was
created to offer low cost legal services to indigent noncitizens in New York. Id.
at 13. Also, the Department of Justice has an Executive Office for Immigration
Review that provides education to noncitizens regarding removal proceedings.
Id. at 14. However, because it is government funded, it cannot provide legal
representation. Id. Still, these legal programs are inadequate replacements.
Adams, supra note 10, at 178-79. This is because programs administered by
the EOIR are limited to only those noncitizens who are detained and
ultimately only ten percent of those detained noncitizens are able to actually
obtain legal representation. Id.
115. Kerwin, supra note 110, at 7-8.
116. In Aguilera-Enriquez, the Court administered a test to determine
whether appointed counsel was necessary for the circumstances presented in
that case. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 568. The mere use of a test in order
to determine this showed that the Sixth Circuit must believe that there is
some circumstance under which appointed counsel would be necessary for a
noncitizen in immigration removal proceedings. Id.
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expense” language must be removed from the INA in order to
allow for appointed counsel in necessary circumstances.117 The
American Bar Association has called for the removal of this
language because it is a barrier to not only representation of
noncitizens, but also any sort of legal assistance for them.118
Removing this language will allow the courts to consider the
individual circumstances and appoint counsel when due process
requires. The concerns of “opening the floodgates” to appointed
counsel in all circumstances will remain implausible in this
proposal because the court will still determine when the
circumstances are appropriate on a case-by-case basis.119
C. Cost to the United States
Opponents to appointed counsel for immigration removal
proceedings will likely argue that the cost of implementing this
program will make it impossible and outweigh its benefits.
However, studies have shown that appointing counsel can actually
make the system more efficient and less costly.120 For instance,
117. Some have argued that by not allowing for appointed counsel, the
entire “Right to Counsel” provision of the INA is useless for indigent
noncitizens. See David A. Robertson, An Opportunity to Be Heard: The Right to
Counsel in a Deportation Hearing, 63 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1026-27 (1988)
(explaining how a noncitizen who makes a claim has an interest in having the
assistance of counsel but an indigent alien automatically loses this supposed
statutory right to counsel unless he is able to search for and find free legal
services). However, many times indigent noncitizens are not able to find free
legal aid and are left with a “meaningless and unequally applied right.” Id. at
1035-36.
118. Pena, supra note 108, at 5. The ABA adopted the recommendations set
forth by Pena. Id. at 1. The ABA explicitly “supports the due process right to
[appointed] counsel . . . in [immigration] removal proceedings.” Id. Even
though the “at no expense” provision does not specifically prohibit appointed
counsel in removal proceedings, the ABA proposes overturning this legislation
so that access to appointed counsel will be easier, and the courts will not be
able to use the language to claim that it is bound to only offer counsel at no
expense to the government. Id. at 10.
119. See Kaufman, supra note 10, at 149 (explaining that “the burdens of
instituting such a system would be substantially outweighed by the benefits
that counsel can provide to noncitizens facing deportation and to the smooth
and efficient administration of the immigration system”).
120. Kerwin, supra note 111, at 14. Ninety-three percent of removal cases
resulted in relief when counsel under the IRP program represented the
noncitizen. Id. The benefits extend to both the federal government and the
noncitizen. See Recommendations for Reforming Our Immigration Detention
System and Promoting Access to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, CONST.
PROJECT 1, 8, http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/359.pdf (last visited Feb.
3, 2013) (explaining that noncitizens benefit from legal representation because
their “basic due process rights are upheld” with regards to removal). The
federal government benefits because it allows for a more efficient removal
process as attorneys can be adequately prepared before going before the
Immigration Judge leading to faster proceedings. Id. Further, the increased
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evidence shows that noncitizen representation in removal
proceedings benefits the government financially because of
improved appearance rates, fewer continuances, and shorter
detention periods.121 It also leads to financial savings through a
reduction in frivolous claims.122
Additionally, the cost of implementing the program would not
be as extensive as one would think due to the already existing
legal aid provided by non-profits.123 The government would thus
only need to “merely . . . fill in the gaps” to help noncitizens not
already helped by these nonprofits.124
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Turner strengthens the argument that can be
made by advocates for a right to appointed counsel in removal
proceedings because it is another precedent set by the Supreme
Court pointing to its belief that there are areas under which
appointed counsel is necessary in civil proceedings. By using the
above-mentioned cases, a strong argument can be made for
appointed counsel, especially once the financial and civil-liberty
benefits of appointed counsel for indigent noncitizens are
discovered.
As it will take time to bring these arguments to the Supreme
Court, advocates can preliminarily lobby for changes to the INA
that will remove the “at no expense” provision. This change will
allow better access for noncitizens to legal advice for now, and will
eventually lead to the ultimate goal of access to appointed counsel
for indigent noncitizens.

efficiency could reduce detention and lower the costs of that as well. Id.
121. CONST. PROJECT, supra note 120, at 16-17.
122. Id. at 17.
123. Robertson, supra note 117, at 1036.
124. Id.

